The Decline In Casualties
Several of my readers have noticed the stories, as have I: the plain fact is that, despite the inability of the Iraqis to put aside their squabbling and form a government, American casualties are a fraction of what they were a scant few months ago. The media coverage seems to tell of American troops under constant seige, but this story in Armed Forces Journal (hat tip: Wretchard) tells another story:
There are more than 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, 23,000 of whom are Marines. But even in the most insurgent-infested places in Iraq, the troops aren’t doing much. The Fallujahs and Mosuls and Tall Afars are history. The insurgents seem to be lying low. They’re not coming out in great numbers to confront U.S. troops. They’re not mounting as many effective IED attacks.
Sometimes it seems the American forces are searching for things to do — going on patrol for the sake of going on patrol. At some point that patrol is going to hit an IED — it’s a numbers game. But it’s unlikely that a patrol was specifically targeted. It’s just bad luck.
Could the insurgents be executing a similar strategy to the Taliban in Afghanistan? As Sean D. Naylor reported in the February issue of AFJ, Special Forces officers who work closely with tribal militias in Afghanistan’s most remote provinces warn that the former regime that protected al-Qaida is lying in wait, marshalling resources for the day America leaves. The absence of significant Taliban-led violence during Afghanistan’s elections last fall was an attempt to lull the coalition into a sense of accomplishment, Special Forces officers fear.
The much-heralded “cease-fire” during Iraq’s parliamentary elections Dec. 15 could be interpreted the same way.
Though few military commanders in Iraq have come around to that idea, it’s hard to dismiss the prospect.
It’s not necessarily the case, then, that the insurgency has run out of steam, or that our policy of ‘Iraqification’ is responsible. Nonetheless, it’s a welcome trend. Regardless of casualty levels, though, the problem remains the lack of a powerful unity government:
Clearly, the key to a U.S. exit from Iraq is the establishment of a competent, aggressive, well-led Iraqi army and the continued progress of electoral politics.
Signs of either were mixed. The Iraqi Army, which in some cases was bold and decisive, still has a long way to go. And though Sunnis came out in greater numbers for December’s parliamentary elections, suspicion grows of the Shiite majority.
So, with an apparent lull in the insurgency, a fitfully maturing political process and an Iraqi Army slowly but surely hardening into a viable defense force, American troops are driving around town looking for IEDs and humping 50 miles searching for weapons in a country where practically every junk pile hides a collection of ancient AK47 magazines and rusty 60mm mortar rounds.
Does this sound like the time to just pack up and run to you? Thank God our President has more resolution than most of the Congress…
UPDATE 10:08 a.m.: Commenter Chris Breisch suggests this link, and I concur…
If we’re going to train their army, they need to be trained. That’s not happening nearly fast enough, clearly. And if we’re going to encourage them to get on the path to self-governance, we need to not send in Condi Rice and Jack Straw to chide them, because it is just going to make them mad.
Please check here for some interesting casualty #’s.
The insurgents have gone dormant. They understand that coaxing us out by temporarily standing down will be more effective and expedient then trying to drive us out. They see that their previous activity has driven support for the US presence in Iraq to all time lows, only to also see no diminution of the President’s commitment to the task. The risk they take by going dormant is that those that replace our forces, when we leave, are competent to do the job of maintaining security.
So our deadline for leaving is not a date certain but when certain conditions have been met. I think Fargus has it right: the conditions of our leaving depend on the proper and timely training of the Iraqi Army. This is not happening fast enough – but I’m not qualified to judge whether it is happening as fast as it can effectively be done. To build a house you need excavators, foundation pourers, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, finish workers – but you can’t put them all on the job site on the first day in the hopes that the house will be completed in less time.
“It’s not happening fast enough.” Fair question, but how does one answer effectively if we have no blueprint to go on here? Does anyone have another recent example of where an occupying military force trains a domestic replacement army to eventually take their place? And the example must not include just a police force, but a large -scale army as well?
I can’t think of a relevant example here – if anyone has one, I’m all ears.
Chris, good link – I’ll update the post…
dmac, you’re right there. It’s easy to say; this is too that… that has not enough of this…. Compared to what? Historical analysis reveals the Iraq front to have the LOWEST casualty rate of any comparable American deployment (‘cept maybe Afghanistan) and by “comparable” I mean even much more modest in terms of resources committed and political goals, both realized and potential. Lately I’ve been reading up on the Civil War, it’s immediate predeceding events and our own Revolution. By any standard barring the one that presumes no good has, will, or CAN come of our Iraqi adventure the thing is a raging success to date. My crystal ball is on the fritz so I’m leaving things in Dub’s paws. He’s gotten us this far…
Going dormant for an insurgency dependent on foreign support has its own downside risks. How exactly will they draw volunteers to Iraq? The slogan “Come hide quietly with us,” hardly sounds inviting to someone looking to be a martyr.